Not in Our Name: When Zeal Is Misplaced
Rabbi Shay Tahan
Is It Permissible to Block Roads?
Recently in Israel, blocking roads has become a common phenomenon, and therefore the halachic perspective on this matter must be clarified. From a number of places in Chazal and the poskim it clearly emerges that it is forbidden to block public passage.
The Gemara states (Bava Kamma 28a): “If one filled his fellow’s courtyard with barrels of wine or oil, the owner of the courtyard may break them and go out, break them and enter.” That is, if someone blocked the path with barrels, the courtyard owner may proceed as usual even if he breaks them in the process. Tosafot add that the Sages did not trouble him to arrange the barrels one atop another. The Chazon Ish explained that this is because the owner of the barrels acted without permission.
From here we learn that a person may not block a passage.
Likewise, Chazal said (Bava Batra 12a): “A path that the public has established use of may not be damaged.” Therefore, if a public path ran through someone’s field and he took it and gave them another path on the side, what he gave is valid, but his original path does not revert to him.
We also find a prohibition against building a sukkah in a public thoroughfare, as ruled by the Rema (Orach Chaim 637:3). The Mishnah Berurah (10) cites the Magen Avraham that the reason people nowadays build sukkot in the public domain is that all Jews waive their rights to the space; however, where non-Jews pass, one may not build.
Departing from the Norm for an Important Purpose
At times there are situations in which unusual steps are required to achieve an important goal. For example, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef permitted teachers to strike in order to raise their salaries (Yechaveh Da’at IV:48), though he emphasized that Torah study may not be suspended. Similarly, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein wrote: “The unions in our country have a basis in law, for they are members of one profession and the majority. Therefore, what they decide — not to work until their pay is increased and the like — is an enactment by which they may compel even the minority who did not agree.”
Likewise, the Steipler wrote (Karyana D’Igrata I:178) that it is permissible to delay the Torah reading on Shabbat for the sake of safeguarding communal needs, such as fixing the kashrut system of a city. From these sources one might infer that blocking roads for worthy causes could also be permitted.
However, it must be emphasized that such permission exists only when there is a clear and elevated public need. Not everyone who wishes may take authority for himself; rather, a decision of leading Torah authorities, or at least a competent beit din, is required. Otherwise, each person would act on his own authority, public order would collapse, and normal life could not continue. Thus wrote Rabbi Moshe Feinstein and Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach regarding professional strikes for higher wages: they should be permitted only by instruction of a distinguished halachic authority.
Furthermore, blocking roads can endanger the public — for example, people needing to reach a hospital, ambulances engaged in life-saving work, and other delays that disrupt normal public life.
Rabbi Yitzchak Zilberstein already ruled (Shiurei Torah LaRof’im I, p. 79) that doctors may not strike, because they deal with a matter of loss — healing the sick — and a worker may not withdraw from work in a matter of loss. In addition, they perform work needed by the public, and the Tosefta (Bava Metzia 11:27) states that one may not suspend something required by the public.
All the more so: if doctors may not strike, certainly one may not prevent them from reaching their workplace or prevent patients from reaching a doctor. Blocking roads that harms essential public needs stands in direct opposition to these principles.
Destruction of Property
The prohibition against destroying property is derived from the verse: “For from it you shall eat, and you shall not cut it down.” The Rambam writes that this refers to destroying anything without a constructive purpose. However, this itself could be misunderstood to imply that if something is destroyed for a reason, it would be permitted. The Ramban likewise writes that destruction without a reason is forbidden, which could suggest that with a reason it might be allowed.
The meaning here is that destroying one’s own property is permitted only when there is a constructive purpose. Thus, in wartime one may cut down trees if necessary to conquer the enemy. However, for any reason it is not permitted to destroy another person’s property — such as overturning police cars, burning garbage cans, toppling street signs, or anything similar.
Needless to say, if religious or charedi individuals engage in any of the destructive behaviors mentioned above, this constitutes a grave chilul Hashem, as religious people then appear wild, careless, and destructive in the eyes of onlookers. Actions like these do not advance any worthy cause; on the contrary, they generate resentment toward Torah and Judaism, distance hearts, and create hostility where respect could have existed. The damage is not only physical but spiritual and communal, as it shapes public perception and influences how Judaism itself is judged. All the more so when such conduct occurs in a Torah city such as Bnei Brak, which is widely recognized as a symbol of Torah life; misconduct there risks desecrating the very values the city represents and undermining its role as a beacon of sanctity and moral example.
Originally published in 5TownsCentral; also published in The Jewish Vues.
