One should not answer amen to the yehi ratzon that is recited after the reading of Tehillim via telephone or a ‘Zoom’ device and the like.
Sources and Explanations
The basis of this halacha is according to what we wrote, with the help of Heaven, in our small book ‘Shaf Veyativ’ – Laws of Corona (siman 2); we will copy most of the words from there.
A group of Tehillim readers, each of whom reads at home, and at the end of their reading one person goes onto the telephone line or onto a ‘Zoom’ device and the like and recites the prayer of yehi ratzon: is it permitted to answer amen to this prayer, which one hears through the device?
Now, regarding the law of joining a minyan, we learned in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 55:13) that only if a person is in one place with the tzibbur does he join the minyan. For so it is written there: “All ten must be in one place, with the shaliach tzibbur among them; and one who stands in the doorway from the doorstop outward, that is, when the door closes, from the inner place (edge) of the thickness of the door and outward, is considered as outside.” And the Shulchan Aruch writes again (55:18): “If some of the ten are in the synagogue and some of them are in the courtyard, they do not join together.”
However, the Pri Megadim explained that this refers to joining to make up the ten, but if there are already ten praying in one place, one may join with them while standing in another place, even though he is not with them and does not see them, since even a barrier of iron does not separate between Israel and their Father in Heaven (Pesachim 85b). And the Mishnah Berurah also cites this (se’if katan 57), writing: “The Pri Megadim writes that the cases of se’if 17, 18 and 19 refer to where they do not see one another, for where they see one another, even in two actual houses they join together, similar to zimun below in siman 195; and some are stringent even when they see one another. And in a pressing situation, it is possible that one may be lenient.”
And the Mishnah Berurah writes (se’if katan 60): “Even if he is in another house, completely far away; for since ten are in one place, the Shechinah dwells among them, and then even a barrier of iron does not separate between anyone who wishes to join himself and his Father in Heaven, Who dwells among these ten.” Therefore, if there is indeed a minyan of ten praying, another person, even if he is in another city or country, can join with them, and it is considered for him as though he prayed with the tzibbur.
Are we concerned about an interruption of something unclean or of idolatry?
However, in se’if 20 the Shulchan Aruch cites the view of “some say,” that if between the place where he is and the place where the minyan of worshippers is there is filth or idolatry or a gentile (there is a dispute regarding a gentile), this is considered an interruption and he cannot join. He writes: “If ten were in one place and they say kaddish and kedushah, even one who is not with them may respond; and some say that there must not be an interruption of something unclean or of idolatry.”
However, first one must examine the fact that the Shulchan Aruch here adopted two differing opinions: do we follow the unattributed (stam) opinion or the “some say”? This is a topic that has been discussed extensively in the words of the poskim, and we will bring these matters only for the sake of the new points that were raised in them. Now, the explanation of this rule was written in the Responsa of the Rema of Fano (siman 97), as follows: “Know that that author, the master of the exiles, this is his way in the Shulchan Aruch, which is established for halachic ruling: to bring first the more widely accepted opinion, and where there is reason to be concerned for another view, he brings it in the name of ‘some say.’ If so, what he stated first, without attribution, to permit, is a complete and absolute ruling according to his view, and he mentioned the second view only to show respect to its authors, who are also great and many, etc.” See there. Every learner will see that his words appear self-contradictory, for he opened by saying that there is reason to be concerned for the view of the “some say,” and concluded that the stam view is a complete and absolute ruling and the view of the “some say” was written only to show respect to the author of that view.
Now, in the important kuntres (pamphlet) ‘Yirat HaHora’ah,’ at the end of the book ‘Mekabtziel’ by Rabbeinu Yosef Chaim, he cites in the name of the book Be’er Chaim (Bishulei Nochrim, siman 48) a resolution in the name of the great Rosh Yeshivah, the Gaon Rabbi Ezra Attiah zt”l, and his words settle on the heart like ‘kaftor vaferach’ (a bud and a flower). (I recall an interesting explanation of this expression: there are things that are said which sound forced but fit well into the written words, like a button (kaftor) that fits exactly into the hole in which it is placed; and there are things that do not fit well into the written words, but they settle well on the heart of the one who hears them, and they are beautiful and pleasant like a flower. And sometimes they both settle on the heart and fit the words, and this is ‘kaftor vaferach.’) And so he writes there: “The resolution of the matter: if we were to say that the intention of the Shulchan Aruch is that one need not be concerned for this view at all, would this be called showing respect to the author of the view? (That is: if we are not at all concerned in halacha for the view of the ‘some say,’ then what is that respect that the Rema of Fano wrote should be given to them? Merely by bringing them in the book and not adopting them as halacha, would this be called respect for them?) The general principle of the matter is that the intention of the Rema of Fano is as follows: certainly, what the Shulchan Aruch first stated without attribution, to permit, is a complete and absolute ruling according to his view, meaning that this is the strict letter of the law, and one who relies on this view has certainly acted according to the law; nevertheless, he wrote the view of the ‘some say’ in order to be concerned for the other view that the Shulchan Aruch mentioned, and especially where it is easily possible to be concerned for the other view.”
The aforementioned kuntres proved this principle from several places. One of them is from the Beit Yosef (siman 32, se’if 52), who cited in the name of the Rav Aksandrani that the stitching thread around the housing (bayit) of the tefillin must be of one thread that is not broken; and on this the Beit Yosef wrote, “I do not know his source,” and in the Shulchan Aruch he cited his view as “some say,” writing as follows (there, se’if 51): “He should sew three stitches on each side, and the stitching thread should go around on two sides, and he should pass the stitching thread between each compartment; and there is one who says that these twelve stitches should be with one thread.”
On this the book Kol Yaakov writes (se’if 235, in the name of the Nahar Shalom, ot 18): “It appears that the view of the Rav Beit Yosef is not to be concerned for what he said, that if it broke they are invalid; rather, he showed respect to his view by being concerned for it lechatchilah (ab initio). And this is the reason that in the Shulchan Aruch he copied only what he wrote, that they should be with one thread, and did not conclude that if it broke they are invalid. And so appears to be the view of the Lechem Chamudot, and so writes the Levush, that one need be concerned only lechatchilah.”
In truth, the Acharonim disagreed regarding the rules of ruling of Maran the Beit Yosef, whether they are absolute rulings or by way of compromise. For in the introduction of Maran Rabbi Yosef Karo zt”l to his great work Beit Yosef he writes as follows: “It entered my mind that after all the discussion I would rule the halacha and decide between the views, for this is the goal: that we should have one Torah and one law. And I saw that if we came to say that we would decide the law between the poskim with Talmudic arguments and proofs, behold, Tosafot and the novellae of the Ramban, the Rashba and the Ran z”l are full of arguments and proofs for each of the opinions. And who is it whose heart would dare to approach to add arguments and proofs? And who is it whose heart would embolden him to put his head among the mountains, the mountains of God, to decide between them on the basis of arguments and proofs, to refute what they clarified, or to decide where they did not decide? For due to our many sins the breadth of our intellect is too short to understand their words, all the more so to be clever over them. Moreover, even if it were possible for us to tread this path, it would not be proper to hold to it, because it is an exceedingly long path. Therefore I resolved in my mind: since the three pillars of halachic ruling upon whom the house, the House of Israel, relies in their rulings are the Rif, the Rambam and the Rosh z”l, I said to my heart that wherever two of them agree to one opinion, we will rule the halacha like them, etc.”
Now, it is not clear what his view is in the beginning of his words, where he comes to decide between the opinions: whether the intention is as an absolute ruling or as a kind of doubt and compromise. Well known is the approach of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef zt”l in many places, who held that Maran decided as an absolute ruling and one need not take the view of the “some say” into account at all; in contrast, the Or LeTzion (vol. 2, Yesodot BeDarchei HaHora’ah, Anaf 1) understood Maran’s view as a compromise. Therefore, if the “some say” disagrees with the stam, we have arrived here at the aforementioned dispute as to whether to be concerned for the interruption of the filthy thing. However, one must examine here why the Shulchan Aruch wrote this law in the language of “some say”: whether he holds like the “some say” or perhaps does not hold so; for perhaps the Shulchan Aruch comes here with the words of the “some say” to add an additional law to the beginning of his words, and does not come to say that they are differing opinions.
Indeed, so the Kaf HaChaim maintained (se’if katan 95), that almost all the poskim agreed that the halacha follows the “some say,” and the “some say” does not come to disagree with the first opinion but to add. He writes: “Know that although the Shulchan Aruch copied it in the name of ‘there is one who says,’ nevertheless it is a decided and agreed-upon halacha; rather, this is the way of the Rav Beit Yosef, that a new law which he found explicitly only in one posek he writes in the language of ‘there is one who says.’ See Machatzit HaShekel (siman 32, se’if katan 54) and the holy book Kol Yaakov (siman 32, ot 179); and so it is evident from the words of the aforementioned poskim, who established this as halacha, unlike what the Levush wrote.” And so it is in Responsa Minchat Elazar (vol. 2, siman 72), and so Rabbi Ovadia Yosef decided in Yechaveh Da’at (vol. 2, p. 250). However, from the words of the Mishnah Berurah (se’if katan 62) it appears that he is in doubt about this, as he writes: “Since the Shulchan Aruch wrote this law in the language of ‘and some say,’ it implies that this law was not decided for him; and so it is implied from the Rema (79:1, in the gloss) that he does not hold so, as the Magen Avraham wrote there. And see the Chayei Adam, who wrote that it seems to him that one should respond to ‘Amen yehei shemei rabba’ and kedushah, since they are merely verses, but should not respond to Barechu; and see the Levushei Serad.” Therefore, it appears from what we have discussed so far that the matter does not leave the realm of doubt, and certainly one should be stringent not to join a minyan via telephone and not to answer amen. However, in Yechaveh Da’at (which we cited above) he cited the view of the Gaon of Vilna in Ma’aseh Rav (siman 47), who held that one who hears kaddish, kedushah and amen from house to house may respond with the tzibbur even when there is an interruption or idolatry in between, provided that he does not see the idolatry or the unclean thing. And so ruled the Sha’ar Shlomo (siman 105) and the Minchat Elazar (vol. 2, siman 72).
The concern of amen yetomah (an “orphaned” amen) in this case
This should further be discussed from the aspect of what Rabbi David Yosef in Halachah Berurah (siman 55, se’if 48) was stringent about, not to answer amen to a blessing in which one is obligated, for then there is a concern of amen yetomah; as the Shulchan Aruch ruled (124:8) that whenever one is obligated in a blessing and the shaliach tzibbur recites it and this person did not hear it, he should not answer amen after him, for it is an amen yetomah. And for amen yetomah there is a punishment, Heaven forbid, as Chazal said (Berachot 47a): “Whoever answers an amen yetomah, his children will be orphans.”
This corresponds to the approach of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef (Yechaveh Da’at vol. 3, siman 54), that whenever one cannot hear without the device through which the sound is heard, this is not considered hearing. And so he ruled regarding hearing the reading of the Megillah through a loudspeaker: if one can hear the Megillah also without the loudspeaker, he fulfills his obligation, and if he cannot hear without the loudspeaker, he does not fulfill his obligation. And he learned this from the Gemara, Sukkah 2a, “remove Ashterot Karnayim from here,” etc. End of his words. Likewise here, whenever one hears through the telephone or the Zoom device, since without the device he would not be able to hear, he does not fulfill the obligation of prayer with a minyan, and therefore he should also not answer amen to blessings in which he is obligated, for it is an amen yetomah.
The law of answering amen yetomah applies in several places. The Mishnah Berurah (se’if katan 33) cites the views of those who are stringent not to answer amen in the chazzan’s repetition: “Some of the Acharonim are stringent regarding the chazzan’s repetition and hold that since the Rabbis instituted that the chazzan should repeat the prayer, even if all have prayed they are considered as though obligated in that blessing, and they should not answer even if one knows which blessing the chazzan is up to, unless he heard the conclusion of the blessing from the chazzan himself. And one should be concerned for this lechatchilah, to be careful to hear all the blessings of the Shemoneh Esreh from the mouth of the chazzan himself.” And in the Be’ur Halachah (s.v. Veyesh) he wrote that because of this, ‘sit and do nothing’ is preferable. Likewise, in answering amen to kaddish there is the issue of amen yetomah, as written in Igrot Moshe (Yoreh De’ah vol. 4, siman 61:16): “Even in kaddish there is the law of amen yetomah, etc., and likewise in all the laws of amen, the amen of kaddish is equal to the amen at the end of a blessing that one hears, as stated in the Rema (124:11) and in the Mishnah Berurah (se’if katan 37).”
Now, the Or LeTzion (vol. 4, p. 20) ruled not to answer amen via telephone due to the concern of the interruption of a filthy thing that interrupts. And it does not leave the realm of doubt of amen yetomah. Accordingly, in the case of one who answers after the yehi ratzon of Tehillim, since this is not an obligatory amen, he is permitted to answer amen.
In such a manner the amen has nothing upon which to take effect
However, there is still a reason to refrain from answering amen via telephone and other devices, since the amen has nothing upon which to take effect.
Now, in the book Sha’arim Metzuyanim BaHalachah (siman 6, se’if katan 5) he explained how devices such as the telephone, and for our matter also Zoom and the like, operate, as follows: “The aforementioned Geonim discussed from the perspective of Torah law, if in reality one would hear the voice of the person himself with the aid of a mechanical instrument. But in our times it has already been revealed that in the operation of all these devices, such as the telephone and radio and the like, one does not hear the voice of the speaker himself; rather, the operation of all the devices converts the sound waves of a person’s voice into electric waves, and immediately converts them back into sound waves. Therefore, the device that picks up the sound is similar to a gramophone record, where one who hears from it hears only the sound of the record and not the voice of the person himself; consequently, one does not fulfill any mitzvah and does not respond kedushah and Barechu and amen after these blessings.” Also the Gaon Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach wrote in Responsa Minchat Shlomo (vol. 1, siman 9) to prohibit answering amen for one who hears a blessing and the like via telephone, for this reason: that the sound heard is not a human voice, and therefore there is no connection between the listener and the one producing the sound. And afterward he further wrote as follows: “After all the description stated above, it appears that one who hears the sound of the shofar or the reading of the Megillah via telephone or loudspeaker does not fulfill his obligation, because only when the impression of hearing in the ear is made directly by the sound of the shofar, which vibrates the air and creates sound waves in it, is it considered hearing the sound of the shofar; whereas when the ear hears only vibrations of a membrane, even though those vibrations also create actual sound waves in the air just like the sound of the shofar, nevertheless it is reasonable that he hears only the sound of the vibrations of a membrane and not the sound of the shofar, etc. Therefore I am very astonished at several of the great rabbis who permitted hearing the reading of the Megillah through a sound amplifier, and how they did not pay attention to this matter, that one hears only the sound of vibrations of a membrane and not the sound of a person’s reading of the Megillah, etc. The summary of the matter is that one should not use a microphone and loudspeaker in the synagogue for the needs of prayer, since this is considered merely like the waving of the flags that took place in Alexandria of Egypt in order to know where the chazzan was up to in his prayer; but it is not possible at all to fulfill through this hearing anything that one is obligated to hear from the mouth of a person. And although I know that many will be astonished at this and this matter will seem strange in their eyes, nevertheless the truth is as our words, and it is clear in my eyes that this is strange only to those who do not know at all the nature of these devices, but not to those who know the truth; for when I spoke about this with those who understand science and are knowledgeable in halacha, all of them agreed with me.”
In a footnote, the Rav added as follows: “After this article had already been printed, I had occasion to speak with Maran the Chazon Ish zt”l, and he told me that in his opinion this is not so simple, and it is possible that since the sound that is heard is created by the speaker, and the sound is also heard immediately, in the manner of people speaking among themselves, perhaps this too is considered as actually hearing from the mouth of the speaker or the one blowing. And it seems to me that according to this one would have to say that what was said in the Gemara, that if he heard an echo he has not fulfilled his obligation, is because the echo is heard somewhat after the person’s voice, which is not so with a telephone and loudspeaker. In my humble opinion this is a very great novelty, and I do not understand it.” It should be noted that the Chazon Ish did not rule to validate hearing in this way, but only noted that ‘it is possible’ that the reasoning of Rabbi Auerbach is not compelling.
The view of Rabbi Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt”l (Ashrei HaIsh, chapter 10, halacha 11) was also that one should not answer amen to words of holiness heard over the telephone and the like, as follows: “One should not respond with any davar shebikdushah to a blessing and the like that one hears over the telephone or radio, even in a live broadcast, since he has no connection to what is said there. This is similar to a person who received a telegram informing him that a person in another city is reciting a blessing at a certain time, where it is obvious that there is no room to answer amen.”
Therefore, from all the above it emerges as practical halacha that one should be stringent not to answer amen via telephone or a ‘Zoom’ device.
From the sefer “Shaf Veyativ – Laws of Saying Tehillim” by Rabbi Shay Tahan, Chapter 3: Laws Before and After Saying Tehillim, Halacha 15 (p. 42 in the print edition). Translated from the Hebrew original.
